Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure may result in both civil and criminal penalties.

		5500	
		Ser	
		14 June 16	
From:	Naval Intelligence Activity		
	C/O SSO Navy		
	701 South Courthouse Road		
	Bldg #12 Room 3J250		
	Arlington, VA 22204		
То:	Director, Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DoD CAF)		
Subj:	SECURITY ACCESS ELIGIBILITY REPORT (SAER)		
Ref:	(a) ICPG 704.2 of 2 October 2008		
	(b) SSO NAVY 031802Z Jun 14 (BANIF 003-14)		
Encl:	(1) Notice of Proposed Removal, CIPO/ONI-0014, 17 Mar 2016		
	(2)		
he adju access.	continuous evaluation program requires commands to promptly report informated discative criteria contained in reference (a) for all individuals who are indoctrinated Reference (b) provides Special Security Office (SSO) Navy's policy for the located ve Compartmented Information (SCI) access and formal suspension of SCI access.	sted into SCI al removal of	
2. Reas	son for the SAER: Personal Conduct , Use of Information Technology Syst	ems	
3. Indiv	vidual's information:		
a. N	ame: GREENE, LEOLA D.		
b. R	ank/Grade/Designator: GG-0080-12		
c. S	ocial Security Number: (b) (6)		
d. In	nitial SAER 🔀; Follow-up SAER 🔲; Final SAER 🔲		
e. C	urrent indoctrination status: NO X YES		
f. Lo	ocal removal from SCI access: NO  YES		
g. Fo	ormal suspension of access: NO 🔀 YES 🗌		

Attachment 2

Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure may result in both civil and criminal penalties.

Subj: SECURITY ACCESS ELIGIBILITY REPORT (SAER)
h. Current duty station (complete address): SSO NORFOLK, 7941 Blandy Road, Bldg. NH-139, STE 100, Norfolk, Va. 23551-2198
4. Reported information:
a. Provide the appropriate response for each question;
(1) Has any information surfaced that would call into question the individual's allegiance to the U.S.?
NO ⊠ YES □
(2) Has the individual had contact with foreign nationals, entities, or interests that create a heightened risk?
NO ⊠ YES □
(3) Has the individual acted in such a way as to establish a preference for a foreign country over the U.S., such as seeking citizenship in a foreign country?
NO ⊠ YES □
(4) Has the individual been involved in sexual behavior that involves a criminal offense or which may cause vulnerability to blackmail or coercion?
NO ⊠ YES □
(5) Has the individual refused to cooperate during the security clearance process, to include providing full, truthful answers on security forms or refusing to cooperate with security officials?
NO X YES
(6) Has the individual been involved in conduct that would show questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard protected information?
NO ☐ YES ☒
(7) Has the individual self-reported or exhibited any financial delinquencies? If yes, a detailed

2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRIVACY SENSITIVE

financial worksheet must be included.

Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure may result in both civil and criminal penalties.

Subj: SECURITY ACCESS ELIGIBILITY REPORT (SAER)
NO ☐ YES ☒
(8) Does the individual exhibit any signs of an unusually high standard of living or any unexplained affluence?
NO ☑ YES □
(9) Has the individual self-reported or has the individual demonstrated any evidence of frequent, habitual, or compulsive gambling?
NO ⊠ YES □
(10) Has the individual self-reported or had any alcohol related incidents at work, home, or involving legal authorities?
NO X YES
(11) Has the individual voluntarily sought or been referred for counseling due to alcohol use?
NO 🖾 YES 🗀
(12) Has the individual self-reported or been involved in illegal drug activity such as using, buying or selling illegal drugs, or involved in the misuse of prescription or over the counter medications?
NO 🖾 YES 🗀
(13) Has the individual been treated for or diagnosed with any illness related to a mental health disorder (do not include counseling for marital, family, grief not related to violence by the individual, strictly related to adjustment from service in a military combat environment, or related to sexual assault upon the subject)?
NO X YES [
(14) Has the individual self-reported or been arrested, detained, or been a party to a civil or criminal action by either military or civilian authorities?
NO ⊠ YES □
(15) Has the individual been involved in a security violation or the possible or probable compromise or unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information?

3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRIVACY SENSITIVE

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRIVACY SENSITIVE Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure may result in both civil and criminal penalties.

Subj: SECURITY ACCESS ELIGIBILITY REPORT (SAER)
NO ☐ YES ☒
(16) Is the individual involved in an outside employment or activity that could cause a conflict of interest with security responsibility and could create an increased risk of authorized disclosure of classified information?
NO 🗵 YES 🗌
(17) Has the individual shown noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines, or regulations involving information technology systems?
NO ☐ YES ☒
(18) Has the individual been declared an unauthorized absentee or deserter?
NO ⊠ YES □
(19) Has the individual contemplated, attempted, or committed suicide?
NO ⊠ YES □
(20) Has the individual been determined to have not been able to successfully complete a polygraph examination due to deception, physiological responses, or detection of countermeasures?
NO ⊠ YES □
b. Provide explanatory details for all YES answers (use a separate sheet if necessary). Ensure you provide the nature and seriousness of the conduct, circumstances surrounding the conduct, frequency and recency, motivation for the conduct, willfulness of the individual's participation or conduct, how the command became aware of the conduct, and knowledge the individual had of the consequences involved:
See below statements
5. Command observations and actions:

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRIVACY SENSITIVE
Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure may result in both civil and criminal penalties.

a. Provide observations regarding the individual's character and stability which should be considered in a determination of SCI eligibility. Include information pertaining to the individual's trustworthiness.

reliability, dependability, discretion, and overall personal conduct:

Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure may result in both civil and criminal penalties.

Subj: SECURITY ACCESS ELIGIBILITY REPORT (SAER)

On 22 October 2015, Naval Intelligence Activity, Inspector General Office, received an email from Army Specialist (SPC) (b) (6) United States Army, expressing concerns that her Personal Identifiable Information (PII) was uploaded into a State of Virginia court website regarding a child custody case with Mr. (b) (6) Ms. Greene's family member, without her knowledge. Ms. (b) (6) stated that she was made aware of the uploaded information through another series of emails from Mr. (b) (6) a civilian, employed with the United States Air Force (USAF), in which she may have been inadvertently copied. On 01 February 2016, upon meeting with Ms. (b) (6) Regional SSO Operations Branch Head, Ms Greene was asked to provide an explanation of the email to Mr. (b) (6) In which the subject line stated "HEY I NEED HELP FINDING INFORMATION ON A ARMY SOLDIER". In accordance to Ms. Greene's written statement, dated 01 February 2016, she stated that the email sent to Mr. (b) (6) was in regards to a child custody and visitation issue between her cousin, and Army SPC(b) (6) Ms. Greene further identified Mr.(b) (6) as, "my longtime (b) (6) friend of over 20 years who is retired Sergeant First Class (SFC) from the Army, who 'happened' to work in the Pentagon" and since Ms. Greene was not familiar with the Army, she reached out to him to obtain information regarding Army SPC(b) (6) Ms. Greene stated that she forwarded information to Mr. (b) (6) to include Army SPC(b) (6) social security number to obtain the information she was seeking. Ms. Greene further stated that the email was on the "personal" side, not work affiliated what so ever." Army SPC (b) (6) salleged that her Leave and Earning Statement, Enlisted Record Brief (ERB), and military orders to Korea were submitted to the court by Ms. Greene's family member.

Concern #1 is directed to the Personal Conduct and the Unauthorized Disclosure of Information. Specifically, the Privacy Act of 1974 regulations pertaining to unauthorized disclosures without consent cites the following: "No Agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains." By Ms. Greene's own admission, using her professional contacts and government systems, she intentionally disclosed and forwarded personally identifiable information (PII) for personal gain and completely unrelated to work. Her actions were in direct violation of the Privacy Act of 1974 and in direct conflict with Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG-704.2) Adjudicative Guidelines for; Personal Conduct where the concern exhibits conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations; and Handling Personal Information where there is concern over the deliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and regulations for protecting classified or other sensitive information and raises doubt about her individual trustworthiness, Judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability to safeguard such information. The Privacy Act imposes civil and criminal liability on agencies, agency employees and contractors for Privacy Act violations, including unauthorized disclosures without consent. Ms. Greene played a prominent role in the disclosure of PII without authorization, by her actions in initiating and forwarding information regarding Army SPC (b) (6) to Mr. (b) (6) Furthermore, her conduct was not connected to any assignments within the scope of her employment and not in furtherance of the Navy's mission.

5

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRIVACY SENSITIVE
Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure may result in both civil and criminal penalties.

Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure may result in both civil and criminal penalties.

Subj: SECURITY ACCESS ELIGIBILITY REPORT (SAER)

Concern #2 is directed to the Use of Information Technology Systems and the Misuse of the Government Computer. Specifically, on 13 January 2015, Ms. Greene used her workplace government computer to send an email to Mr. (b) (6) a civilian, employed with the United States Air Force (USAF) who was working at the Pentagon. The subject line stated the following: "HEY I NEED HELP FINDING INFORMATION ON A ARMY SOLIDER". Ms. Greene later sent another email from her government computer email account in which she communicated: "Sending all the info and attachments to your email." It was discovered that these emails were concerning Ms. Greene's request to obtain information regarding Army SPC(b) (6) In connection with a personal matter involving her family member. Ms. Greene misused her government assigned computer for personal use and activities entirely unrelated to the duties and responsibilities of her position. Her actions were in direct violation of ICPG-704.2 Adjudicative Guidelines for the USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS; Unauthorized use of a government or other information technology system; and Personal Conduct. By Ms. Greene's own admission she forwarded PII through a government computer and did not recognize it as a misuse since it was, "totally on the personal side." The concern exhibits Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations pertaining to information technology systems which may raise security concerns about an individual's reliability and untrustworthiness calling into question the willingness or ability to properly protect sensitive systems, networks, and information. Information Technology Systems include all related computer hardware, software, firmware, and data used for the communication, transmission, processing, manipulation, storage, or protection of information.

During the course of this inquiry review it was noted that Ms. Greene exhibited additional infractions of personal conduct relating to excessive leave usage Performance Counseling in September 2011 followed by a Letter of Requirement for excessive tardiness and absences in August 2012. Ms. Greene also received Performance Counseling in August of 2012 for failing to meet established deadlines.

On 17 February, Ms. Greene notified her local SSO that she is pending Chapter 13, Bankruptcy and meeting with her attorney to review the case and make a final decision. Ms. Greene was directed to contact her Regional SSO and report the financial issues and provide supporting documentation. Ms. Greene failed to provide any updates on her financial status since February 2016.

b. Provide information regarding investigations or disciplinary or other actions taken by the command:

A Preliminary Inquiry was conducted on 01 Feb 2016 by Ms. (b) (6) (2nd Level Supervisor) with Ms. Greene at the SSO Norfolk Office. Initially, A Notice of Proposed Removal from Employment Enclosure (1) was issued to Ms. Greene on 17 March 2016. Ms. Greene utilized her appeal rights while assigned Administrative Leave. Ms. Greene was under a Local Removal of SCI Access during the appeal

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRIVACY SENSITIVE

Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure may result in both civil and criminal penalties.

#### Subj: SECURITY ACCESS ELIGIBILITY REPORT (SAER)

period. An updated letter was issued downgrading the Notice of Proposed Removal to a 14-Day Suspension CIPO Letter Ser XXXXXX, Date XX XXX XX.

6. Provide a command recommendation to the DoD CAF regarding granting SCI eligibility:

Ms. Leola Greene is a United States Government Civilian employee trained as a Security Specialist, GG-0080-12 and employed at Regional Special Security Office Norfolk as an Assistant SSO. She is a Retired U.S. Navy Cryptologic Technician Administrative (CTA). Her duties and responsibilities throughout her Active Duty and Civilian career include continuous training on and diligence in the protection SCI and associated Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and enforcement of the Privacy Act of 1974. The Privacy Act requires federal agencies to obtain consent before releasing personal records from government databases. The statute does, however, provide various exceptions under which agencies may disclose records without first obtaining consent. For example, agencies may disclose records pursuant to a "routine use"—a disclosure "compatible with the purpose" for which the information was collected. Agencies may also disclose PII to agency employees and contractors who need the PII to perform their jobs, pursuant to a court order or in response to a "showing of compelling circumstances affecting the health or safety of an individual."

Ms. Greene's admitted transmission of Ms. (b) (6) SSN via the use of government information systems to an admitted former friend working at the Pentagon to gain information regarding a "Personal" family issue is in direct violation of the Privacy Act of 1974 and is in direct violation of protection ethics entrusted to an individual with a Top Secret Special Compartmented Information Security Eligibility.

Ms. Greene has shown no indication that she neither acknowledges her actions to be wrong, nor accepts responsibility for her action. In addition, based on Ms. Greene's time and attendance counseling record, re-occurring financial instability, and willful choice to obtain PII for personal reasons, I am not confident that she is capable of rehabilitation.

Ms. Greene is a routine user of the Joint Personnel Accounting System (JPAS) and is fully aware and trained in each of the stated JPAS website warnings and references. Requesting others to provide PII for personal use is a violation of the For Official Use Only (FOUO) principles:

Recommendation: As an SSO, it is crucial Ms. Greene display unwavering trustworthiness, reliability, honesty, and integrity. I no longer have the confidence in Ms. Greene's ability to assist in the management of Navy's Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) security program, or manage, inspect, and provide oversight of SSO Norfolk and its affiliated SCI facilities. Ms. Greene's actions are in direct conflict with her position and requirements for managing the personnel security program with integrity. Additionally, she has shown a pattern of financial difficulties with the short sale of her home

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRIVACY SENSITIVE

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRIVACY SENSITIVE Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure may result in both civil and criminal penalties.

Subj: SECURITY ACCESS ELIGIBILITY REPORT (SAER)

in 2012, previously reported, and her recent admittance to contemplating filing for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy.

It is my recommendation to revoke Ms. Leola Greene's TS/SCI eligibility based on the Information provided above regarding the mishandling of PII, personal conduct, misuse of government equipment and pattern of potential financial difficulties

7. Point of contact for this information is Mr. (b) (6)

(b) (6)

NIA Chief of Staff
Captain

Copy to: RSSO Arlington RSSO Norfolk SSO Navy




## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONSOLIDATED ADJUDICATIONS FACILITY BUILDING 600 10TH STREET

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MD 20755-5615



November 8, 2018 DoD CAF 18-P-01053



Dear Ms. Greene:

This is in response to your September 19, 2018 request for a copy of the records pertaining to you, which the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DoD CAF) relied upon in its preliminary decision to deny/revoke your security eligibility, pursuant to DoDM 5200.02. Your request was received in the DoD CAF Privacy Office on October 11, 2018.

Pursuant to the DoD CAF Memorandum dated August 1, 2018, Subject: Intent to Revoke Eligibility for Access to Classified Information, Assignment to Duties that have been Designated National Security Sensitive, and Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), the information utilized in the Statement of Reasons (SOR) was obtained from the following record:

 Naval Intelligence Activity Memorandum, Subject: Security Access Eligibility Report (SAER), dated June 14, 2016

The provisions of the law governing release of records under the *Privacy Act of 1974*, generally do not allow an organization to release records other than those they created. While processing your request, it was determined that the record responsive to your request falls under the release authority of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. As our office is not authorized to release records that originated from another agency, we have referred your request and the pertinent record to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, FOIA/Privacy Act Program Office/Service Center, ATFN: DNS 36, 2000 Navy Pentagon, Washington, DC 20350-2000, for action and direct response to you.

We hope this information is helpful to you, and appreciate the opportunity to assist you in this matter.

Sincerely,

/// Signed ///

for/ (b) (6)

Chief, Information Management DoD Consolidated Adjudications Facility

PRIVACY ACT INFORMATION

In compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974, this information is Personal Data and must be protected from public disclosure.